eBook di filosofia: A. Varzi, Logic, Ontological Neutrality, and the Law of Non-Contradiction

Varzi

Achille Varzi, Logic, Ontological Neutrality, and the Law of Non-Contradiction

As a general theory of reasoning—and as a theory of what holds true under every possi-ble circumstance—logic is supposed to be ontologically neutral. It ought to have nothing to do with questions concerning what there is, or whether there is anything at all. It is for this reason that tra-ditional Aristotelian logic, with its tacit existential presuppositions, was eventually deemed inade-quate as a canon of pure logic. And it is for this reason that modern quantification theory, too, with its residue of existentially loaded theorems and inferential patterns, has been claimed to suffer from a defect of logical purity. The law of non-contradiction rules out certain circumstances as impossi-ble—circumstances in which a statement is both true and false, or perhaps circumstances where something both is and is not the case. Is this to be regarded as a further ontological bias? If so, what does it mean to forego such a bias in the interest of greater neutrality—and ought we to do so?

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