Peter King, Introduction to “Jean Buridan’s Logic”
La Revista Iberoamericana de Argumentación (RIA) è la rivista online semestrale che si propone di diffondere articoli e saggi sull’argomentazione in lingua spagnola e portoghese (in prevalenza).
“RIA publicará trabajos, ensayos y colaboraciones sobre temas correspondientes a las áreas de la Pragmática y el Análisis del Discurso, la Filosofía del Lenguaje, la Lógica, la Teoría de la Argumentación, el Pensamiento Crítico, la Retórica y el Discurso Público, rigiéndose por los estándares actuales de rigor, calidad y excelencia académica, incluido el sistema de doble arbitraje anónimo.”
Umberto Rivieccio, Neutrosophic Logics: Prospects and Problems
“Neutrosophy has been introduced some years ago by Florentin Smarandache as a new branch of philosophy dealing with “the origin, nature and scope of neutralities, as well as their interactions with different ideational spectra”. A variety of new theories has been developed on the basic principles of neutrosophy: among them is neutrosophic logics, a family of many valued systems that can be regarded as a generalization of fuzzy logics. In this paper we present a critical introduction to neutrosophic logics, focusing on the problem of defining suitable neutrosophic propositional connectives and discussing the relationship between neutrosophic logics and other well-known frameworks for reasoning with uncertainty and vagueness, such as (intuitionistic and interval-valued) fuzzy systems and Belnap’s logic.”
Gotthard Günther, Cybernetic Ontology and Transjunctional Operations
“This contribution was first published in Self-Organizing Systems, (M. C. Yovits, G.T. Jacobi, G.D. Goldstein, eds.), Spartan Books, Washington, 1962, p.313-392. Within this contribution Günther does not use the term “contexture”. He introduced und used the term “contexture” from about 1970 on.”
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Sara L. Uckelman, Modalities in Medieval Logic
Tesi di dottorato discussa nel 2009 presso l’Università di Amsterdam.
The title of this dissertation, Modalities in Medieval Logic, combines two temporally distinct and seemingly disparate fields of logic. The use of term ‘modalities’ in the plural, as opposed to ‘modality’ in the singular, is one of the hall-marks of recent developments in logic, which recognizes that there is no single ‘correct’ choice of modality, but that rather a range of modalities can be fruitfully studied with the tools of formal modal logic. This modern view can be contrasted with the distinctly non-modern view of logic indicated by the other part of the title, ‘medieval’, which brings to mind the narrow and rigid formal system of syllogisticsand Scholasticism.This apparent discrepancy between the two parts of the title immediately raises the question of what can possibly be gained from combining modern logic and medieval logic in the same research programme. Another way to state this question is to split it into two, and to ask what benefit a modern logician might have from looking at medieval logic, and what benefit a historian of medieval logic might have from looking at modern logic.At a very general level, there are two reasons why the study of medieval logic is of interest to the modern logician. The first reason is to see how closely medieval logical theories in different branches (modal logic, temporal logic, quantifier logic, etc.) resemble modern logical theories in these same branches. The second is tosee how much they differ. If the medieval theory is similar to the modern theory, one can ask to what extent we can shed new light on the medieval theory by modeling it with modern formal tools. If the medieval theory differs from the modern theory, one can ask what the causes of these differences are, whether theyare purely historical, accidental, or whether they reflect conscious differences ingoals and aims, and, if the latter, what we can learn from these differences.On the other side of the question, a similar answer can be given. Many medieval logical theories often leave something to be desired in terms of clarity. This can be the result of at least two different factors. The first is that the medieval theories were developed within natural language, and even when this Chapter 1. The changing scope of logic natural language is used in a semi-formal fashion, the possibility for ambiguity still remains. The second is that because medieval logical theories were developed essentially as tools for modeling specific philosophical and theological problems, they often carry extra, non-logical, baggage. Abstracting away from this baggage, often metaphysical in nature, allows for a clearer understanding of the underlyinglogical theory.
“As a general theory of reasoning—and as a theory of what holds true under every possi-ble circumstance—logic is supposed to be ontologically neutral. It ought to have nothing to do with questions concerning what there is, or whether there is anything at all. It is for this reason that tra-ditional Aristotelian logic, with its tacit existential presuppositions, was eventually deemed inade-quate as a canon of pure logic. And it is for this reason that modern quantification theory, too, with its residue of existentially loaded theorems and inferential patterns, has been claimed to suffer from a defect of logical purity. The law of non-contradiction rules out certain circumstances as impossi-ble—circumstances in which a statement is both true and false, or perhaps circumstances where something both is and is not the case. Is this to be regarded as a further ontological bias? If so, what does it mean to forego such a bias in the interest of greater neutrality—and ought we to do so?“
Il Bulletin of the Section of Logic (BSL) è la rivista online trimestrale peer-reviewed dell’Università di Lodz. Il periodico si proporne di diffondere i risultati più significativi nell’ambito della ricerca logica attraverso articoli che non superino le diciotto pagine. Per accedere agli articoli è necessario cliccare sul bottone “details” presente in alto a destra nella schermata che riporta gli indici dei diversi numeri.
“In 1972: Ryszard Wójcicki, Head of the Section of Logic of the Polish Academy of Sciences, at that time based in Wrocław, launches the newsletter-journal designed for the exchange of scientific results among members of the Section with their national and international partners and cooperators. Jan Zygmunt was the editor of the first six issues of the journal. 1975: Grzegorz Malinowski takes on the responsibility of the Managing Editor. 1992: The Department of Logic of Łódź University, takes over publication from the Polish Academy of Sciences and changes its publication policy into a regular peer-reviewed journal. Grzegorz Malinowski becomes Editor-in-Chief. 2012: To continue Polish logical tradition the Editors decided retain the name of the journal unchanged”
Joseph Vidal-Rosse, Does Gödel’s Incompleteness Theorem Prove That Truth Transcends Proof ?
“Since their appearance in 1931, Gödel’s incompleteness theorems have been the subject of intense philosophical examination. Though the demonstrations of the famous theorems are rather complex, but nevertheless clear, their philosophical implications are far from transparent. Contemporary philosophical logicians disagree on the philosophical significance of the incompleteness theorems , as did Carnap and Gödel themselves, and I believe that the state of the discussion has not changed a lot since the original Carnap-Gödel debate”
Alfred Ayer, Language, Truth and Logic
“Con la prima opera (Language, truth and logic, 1936; trad. it. Linguaggio, verita e logica) cercò di conciliare alcune conclusioni del neopositivismo del Circolo di Vienna con la tradizione antimetafisica dell’empirismo anglosassone. Il principio di verificabilità viene così assunto nell’ambito della distinzione humeana tra proposizioni che enunciano relazioni tra idee e proposizioni fattuali, la cui verità o falsità risulta accertabile mediante osservazioni empiriche. Secondo Ayer, peraltro, la validità di queste ultime non è riconducibile a enunciati protocollari (i punti terminali del processo di controllo empirico postulati dai neopositivisti), e deve quindi limitarsi a una verifica non assoluta (criterio di verificabilità debole). Sulla base di questa distinzione, Ayer cerca di salvaguardare l’autonomia e la rispettiva validità della filosofia (che si basa su proposizioni analitiche) e della scienza, laddove giudica come prive di significato le asserzioni della metafisica, che non esprimono relazioni tra idee né ipotesi empiriche. Dopo gli anni Quaranta, con l’intensificarsi delle ricerche nell’ambito dell’analisi del linguaggio, grazie all’insegnamento di Moore, Ryle e soprattutto del secondo Wittgenstein, Ayer si distacca dalle posizioni dell’empirismo logico per avvicinarsi alle tesi sostenute a Oxford e a Cambridge dagli analisti del linguaggio comune” (tratto da Treccani.it)