Archivi tag: Novecento

Archivio Nicolao Merker: biografia, bibliografia e testi online

Nicolao Merker

L’ Archivio Nicolao Merker è il sito dell’Università La Sapienza dedicato a Nicolao Merker docente di Storia della Filosofia moderna presso l’Ateneo romano dal 1974 fino al 2006.

Il sito contiente la biografia del filosofo, una sua bibliografia completa e rende accessibili i testi dei suoi libri ormai fuori commercio.

Lascia un commento

Archiviato in Bibliografie, Biografie, eBook di Filosofia, Filosofia contemporanea, Filosofia moderna

Physics History Network: il portale dedicato ai fisici americani

phn-long

Physics History Network è il portale sviluppato dall’History Programs dell’American Institute of Physics che contiene risorse biografiche su più di 850 fisici e scienziati americani e sulle istituzioni presso cui si sono svolte le loro ricerche.

Il portale è organizzato in 4 grandi sezioni connesse tra loro:

É possibile inoltre accedere alle digitalizzazioni dell’Archivio Emilio Segrè, ad altre collezioni digitali dell’American Institute of Physics, a interviste (dal 1960 a oggi) e a guide agli archivi.

1 Commento

Archiviato in Archivi, Bibliografie, Biografie, Fisica, Inventari, Scienza

eBook di filosofia: Celebrating the Life and Work of J. H. van den Berg

JHvandenBerg

Celebrating the Life and Work of J. H. van den Berg (numero speciale della rivista Janus Head)

“Jan Hendrik van den Berg has been especially conscious of the historical and cultural embeddedness of phenomenological psychology. In fact, he was far ahead of the later postmodern critique of the dangers of foundationalism, essentialism, and historical and cultural universalism. He argues that the very project of all phenomenology is contextualized by limits of language, culture, time, and place. According to van den Berg, phenomenological psychology does not claim to have found a universally valid approach to human phenomena; rather, it is always self-conscious of its anthropological starting point. Van den Berg became especially known for the development and application of a historical phenomenological approach that he termed the metabletical method. Metabletica is a word derived from the Greek meaning “to change.” His book Metabletica: Principles of a Historical Psychology (published in English in 1961 as The Changing Nature of Man) describes the changing relation between adults and children many years before a similar work by the French historian Philipe Ariès. For example, Van den Berg describes the process of the infantilization of adulthood and the appearance of puberty as a historial and cultural phenomenon. The special feature of the metabletical method is that it approaches its object of study not diachronically, as development through time, but synchronically, from within a meaningful constitution of relations among different events during the same shared period. For example, in Leven en Meervoud (1963) (published in English in 1974 as Divided Existence), he provides a concrete portrayal and a surprisingly early postmodern interpretation of the development of the human psyche by connecting it with a variety of simultaneous developments in the surrounding culture, showing how the sense of self-identity is increasingly fragmented, divided, and determined by externals.” (tratto da Phenomenology Online)

Lascia un commento

Archiviato in eBook di Filosofia, Filosofia contemporanea, Psicologia

eBook di filosofia: P. Singer, La sofferenza degli animali

Australian philosopher Peter Singer poses for an portrait at Yale University Press office in London

Peter Singer, La sofferenza degli animali (tratto da Liberazione animale)

“Pur appartenendo alla tradizione analitica, ne ha fortemente ridimensionato l’orientamento metaetico, proponendo in sua vece il recupero di un’etica normativa entro cui difendere valori eticamente vincolanti. In una prospettiva utilitaristica ha discusso problemi centrali quali l’eutanasia, l’aborto e il razzismo verso gli animali (in base al quale gli animali sarebbero privi di diritti in quanto inferiori agli uomini).” (tratto da Treccani.it)

1 Commento

Archiviato in eBook di Filosofia, Etica, Filosofia ambientale, Filosofia contemporanea

eBook di filosofia: F. C. Brentano, Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt

Brentano

Franz Clemens Brentano, Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt

“n contrapposizione all’impostazione kantiana, B. riprende suggestioni aristoteliche e scolastiche, criticando inoltre varie dottrine del positivismo inglese di quel tempo. Nella sua opera principale, Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt (2a ed. 1924; trad. it. Psicologia dal punto di vista empirico), B. traccia le linee di una psicologia descrittiva come teoria dei fenomeni psichici, distinta da una psicologia genetica e contrapposta alla scienza naturale, scienza dei fenomeni fisici. La caratteristica fondamentale del fenomeno psichico è la sua intenzionalità (➔) (concetto che B. riprende dalla scolastica), come direzione a un oggetto, inteso, nella dottrina più matura (cui si connette altresì una critica del linguaggio), come reale o cosa. In base al diverso modo di riferirsi all’oggetto B. distingue tra classi di fenomeni psichici: rappresentazioni, giudizi e relazioni affettive (o fenomeni di odio-amore), sostenendo inoltre l’esistenza di una percezione interiore nettamente distinta dalla cosiddetta osservazione interiore. La teoria della verità, in corrispondenza alle posizioni assunte da B. riguardo alla natura del giudizio, diviene teoria dell’evidenza. Importanti gli studi storici su Aristotele. Grande influenza esercitarono le sue dottrine sullo sviluppo della filosofia fenomenologica (Husserl, Stumpf), e su altri pensatori posteriori come Meinong. Altre opere: Vom Ursprung sittlicher Erkenntnis (1889, 2a ed. 1921; trad. it. Sull’origine della conoscenza morale); Die vier Phasen der Philosophie und ihr augenblicklicher Stand (1895, 2a ed. 1926); Von der klassifikation der psychischen Phänomene (1911, 2a ed. 1925).” (tratto da Treccani.it)

 

Lascia un commento

Archiviato in eBook di Filosofia, Filosofia contemporanea

eBook di filosofia: H. Feigl W. Sellars (a cura di), Readings In Philosophical Analysis

sellars

Herbert Feigl Wilfrid Sellars (a cura di), Readings In Philosophical Analysis

con saggi di Quine, Frege, Russell, Carnap, Nagel, Hempel,  Schlick ed altri

“filosofia analitica. In senso lato, ogni impostazione metodologica basata su tecniche concettuali che, pur differenziandosi a seconda dei vari campi di applicazione, s’imperniano tutte sull’analisi, concepita come strumento essenziale dell’indagine. In questo senso si può parlare di f. a. a proposito del Saggio sull’intelletto umano lockiano, delle ricerche di Hume, di certe analisi kantiane, herbartiane e husserliane. In senso specifico, l’espressione indica un orientamento di pensiero sviluppatosi soprattutto in Inghilterra dagli inizi del sec. 20°, e volto prevalentemente allo studio del linguaggio nei suoi vari aspetti (logici, scientifici, quotidiani, etici, ecc.), privilegiando l’analisi di problemi specifici rispetto all’elaborazione di sistemi ampi e comprensivi.” (tratto da Treccani.it)

Lascia un commento

Archiviato in eBook di Filosofia, Filosofia analitica

eBook di filosofia: S. Dasgupta, A History of Indian Philosophy

200px-Surendranath_Dasgupta

Surendranath Dasgupta, A History of Indian Philosophy (1922)

 

1 Commento

Archiviato in eBook di Filosofia, Filosofia indiana

eBook di filosofia: G. Simondon, The Essence Of Technicity

Simondon2

Gilbert Simondon, The Essence Of Technicity

“Gilbert Simondon (1924-1989) was a French philosopher best known for his work on individuation and technology. A student of philosopher of science Georges Canguilhem, Martial Guéroult, phenomenologist Maurice Merleau-Ponty, and Jean Hyppolyte, Simondon’s theory of individuation had a major influence on the work of Gilles Deleuze as well as Bernard Stiegler, Brian Massumi, Adrian Mackenzie and many others.

He studied at the École normale supérieure in Ulm and the Sorbonne, defending his doctoral dissertations in 1958. His main thesis, L’individuation à la lumière des notions de Forme et d’Information, was published in two parts–the first in 1964 under the title L’Individu et sa génèse physico-biologique at PUF, while it is only in 1989 that Aubier published the second part, L’Individuation psychique et collective. While his main thesis, which laid the foundations of his thinking, was not widely read until it was reviewed by Gilles Deleuze in 1966, his complementary thesis, Du Mode d’existence des objets techniques was published by Aubier shortly after being completed (1958). In 2005, Jérôme Millon published a complete edition of the main thesis.” (tratto da Monoskop.org)

Lascia un commento

Archiviato in eBook di Filosofia, Filosofia della scienza

eBook di filosofia: J. Baudrillard, Forget Foucault

Baudrillar3

Jean Baudrillard, Forget Foucault

“In 1976, Jean Baudrillard sent this essay to the French magazine Critique, where Michel Foucault was an editor. Foucault was asked to reply, but remained silent. Forget Foucault (1977) made Baudrillard instantly infamous in France. It was a devastating revisitation of Foucault’s recent History of Sexuality–and of his entire oeuvre–and also an attack on those philosophers, like Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, who believed that desire could be revolutionary. In Baudrillard’s eyes, desire and power were interchangeable, so desire had no place in Foucault’s work. There is no better introduction to Baudrillard’s polemical approach to culture than these pages, in which Baudrillard dares Foucault to meet the challenge of his own thought. This Semiotext(e) edition of Forget Foucault is accompanied by a dialogue with Sylvère Lotringer, “Forget Baudrillard,” a reevaluation by Baudrillard of his lesser-known early works as a post-Marxian thinker. Lotringer presses Baudrillard to explain how he arrived at his infamous extrapolationist theories from his roots in the nineteenth and early twentieth century social and anthropological works of Karl Marx, Marcel Mauss, and Emil Durkheim.”

Lascia un commento

Archiviato in eBook di Filosofia, Filosofia contemporanea

eBook di filosofia: G. Deleuze F. Guattari, What Is Philosophy?

deleuze-et-guattari

Gilles Deleuze Felix Guattari,  What Is Philosophy?

“After a long period in which each pursued his own interests, Deleuze and Guattari published a last collaboration in 1991, What Is Philosophy? In answering their title question, Deleuze and Guattari seek to place philosophy in relation to science and art, all three being modes of thought, with no subordination among them. Thought, in all its modes, struggles with chaos against opinion. Philosophy is the creation or construction of concepts; a concept is an intensive multiplicity, inscribed on a plane of immanence, and peopled by “conceptual personae” which operate the conceptual machinery. A conceptual persona is not a subject, for thinking is not subjective, but takes place in the relationship of territory and earth. Science creates functions on a plane of reference. Art creates “a bloc of sensation, that is to say, a compound of percepts and affects” (WP, 164).

We will deal with Deleuze and the arts in some detail below. In discussing What is Philosophy?, let us concentrate on the treatment of the relation of philosophy and science. We should remember at the outset that the nomad or minor science evoked in A Thousand Plateaus is not the Royal or major science that makes up the entirety of what Deleuze and Guattari call ‘science’ in What is Philosophy?. The motives for this conflation are unclear; in the eyes of some, this change considerably weakens the value of the latter work. Be that as it may, in What is Philosophy? Deleuze and Guattari vigorously deny that philosophy is needed to help science think about its own presuppositions (“no one needs philosophy to reflect on anything” [WP 6]). Instead, they emphasize the complementary nature of the two. First, they point out a number of similarities between philosophy and science: both are approaches to “chaos” that attempt to bring order to it, both are creative modes of thought, and both are complementary to each other, as well as to a third mode of creative thought, art. Beyond these similarities, Deleuze and Guattari distinguish between philosophy as the creation of concepts on a plane of immanence and science as the creation of functions on a plane of reference. Both relate to the virtual, the differential field of potential transformations of material systems, but in different ways. Philosophy gives consistency to the virtual, mapping the forces composing a system as pure potentials, what the system is capable of. Meanwhile, science gives it reference, determining the conditions by which systems behave the way they actually do. Philosophy is the “counter-effectuation of the event,” abstracting an event or change of pattern from bodies and states of affairs and thereby laying out the transformative potentials inherent in things, the roads not taken that coexist as compossibles or as inclusive disjunctions (differentiation, in the terms of Difference and Repetition), while science tracks the actualization of the virtual, explaining why this one road was chosen in a divergent series or exclusive disjunction (differenciation, according to Difference and Repetition). Functions predict the behavior of constituted systems, laying out their patterns and predicting change based on causal chains, while concepts “speak the event” (WP 21), mapping out the multiplicity structuring the possible patterns of behavior of a system—and the points at which the system can change its habits and develop new ones. For Deleuze and Guattari in What is Philosophy?, then, science deals with properties of constituted things, while philosophy deals with the constitution of events. Roughly speaking, philosophy explores the plane of immanence composed of constellations of constitutive forces that can be abstracted from bodies and states of affairs. It thus maps the range of connections a thing is capable of, its “becomings” or “affects.” Science, on the other hand, explores the concretization of these forces into bodies and states of affairs, tracking the behavior of things in relation to already constituted things in a certain delimited region of space and time (the “plane of reference”). How do concepts relate to functions? Just as there is a “concept of concept” there are also “concepts of functions,” but these are purely philosophical creations “without the least scientific value” (WP 117). Thus concrete concepts like that of “deterritorialization” are philosophical concepts, not scientific functions, even though they might resonate with, or echo, scientific functions. Nor are they metaphors, as Deleuze and Guattari repeatedly insist:

Of course, we realize the dangers of citing scientific propositions outside their own sphere. It is the danger of arbitrary metaphor or of forced application. But perhaps these dangers are averted if we restrict ourselves to taking from scientific operators a particular conceptualizable character which itself refers to non?scientific areas, and converges with science without applying it or making it a metaphor (Deleuze 1989: 129).

Deleuze and Guattari’s refusal to recognize that their work contains metaphors is due to their struggle against the “imperialism” of the signifying regime, a major theme in both Anti-Oedipus and A Thousand Plateaus: not every relation between different intellectual fields can be grasped by the most common notions of “metaphor,” reliant as they are on the notion of a transfer of sense from primary to secondary signification.” (tratto dalla Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

 

1 Commento

Archiviato in eBook di Filosofia, Filosofia contemporanea