Archivi del mese: settembre 2014

Journal of Evolution and Technology (JET): il periodico online sull’impatto della tecnologia sull’uomo

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Journal of Evolution and Technology (JET) è il periodico online sulle potenzialità della tecnologia sull’uomo nella traccia del transumanesimo,  fondato da Nick Bostrom and David Pearce nel 1998 con il titolo The Journal of Transhumanism. É stato pubblicato dalla World Transhumanist Association fino al 2004, anno in cui la responsabilità della pubblicazione è stata assunta dall’Institute for Ethics and Emerging Technologies.

Central to our thinking, and implicit in the title “evolution and technology,” is the idea – increasingly familiar and plausible – that the human species stands at the threshold of a new form of evolution. This is very different from the slow Darwinian mechanisms of differential survival and reproduction. It is powered, rather, by new technologies that increasingly work their way inward, transforming human bodies and minds. According to this idea, technology can do more than merely give us tools to manipulate the world around us. It can actually alter us, and not just by shaping our neurological pathways when we learn to handle new tools. Our future may, in part, be the product of emerging technologies of human transformation, ranging from genetic engineering to pharmaceutical cognitive enhancement to such radical possibilities as mind uploading and all that it might imply.

This idea of a technologically mediated process of evolution is, of course, familiar to transhumanists, who envisage (and generally welcome) the emergence of intelligences with greater-than-human physical and cognitive capacities. Even outside the transhumanist movement, however, there’s an increasing familiarity with the general idea of a new kind of evolution, no longer the product of Darwinian mechanisms but driven by technology and deliberate choices.

At the same time, this idea, in all its forms, remains controversial. Even if we grant it our broad acceptance there remains much to debate. It is unclear just how the process might be manifested in the years to come, just where it might take us or our successors, and what downsides there might be. No serious person should doubt that there will be risks, possibly on a global scale, in any path of transition from human to posthuman intelligence.

The idea of technologically mediated evolution, perhaps with a great transition from human to posthuman, merits careful study from all available viewpoints. Among writers and thinkers who take the idea seriously, there are bound to be disagreements. To what extent is the process already happening? If it accelerates or continues over a vast span of time, will this be a good thing or a bad thing – or is it a phenomenon that resists moral evaluation? What visions of the human or posthuman future are really plausible: for example, does the idea of mind uploading make good sense when subjected to scientific and logical scrutiny? Reasonable answers to such questions range from radical transhumanist visions of sweeping, rapid, entirely desirable change to various kinds of skepticism, caution, or concern”. (tratto da Transhumanism and The Journal of Evolution and Technology

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Archiviato in Filosofia contemporanea, Filosofia morale, Periodici

eBook di filosofia: Lettere di Cartesio a Elisabetta di Boemia (in inglese)

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Correspondence between Descartes and Princess Elisabeth

“Quando la principessa Elisabetta del Palatinato si ammalò di depressione, Cartesio cercò di consolarla con la filosofia, indicandole il modo per contrastare la sfortuna con la forza della virtù e della ragione. Per meglio dialogare con l’illustre ospite, aveva scelto di commentare il libro che Seneca aveva dedicato alla ‘‘vita beata’’ che, già dal titolo, alludeva al problema della felicità. Traducendo e interpretando il filosofo romano, in parte correggendolo, Cartesio sottolineava la necessità di distinguere tra felicità e beatitudine: la prima dipende dalle cose esteriori, la seconda consiste in uno stato di ‘‘contentezza dello spirito’’ e di ‘‘soddisfazione interiore’’ che non dipende dalla fortuna, ma da noi. Così, il motto di Seneca vivere beate, ossia vivere in beatitudine, presso il filosofo moderno diventava un invito a sforzarsi di raggiungere uno spirito perfettamente contento e soddisfatto.
Alla richiesta di Elisabetta di precisare meglio questa idea, Cartesio osservava che – come avevano detto gli stoici – ci sono due specie di beni: quelli che dipendono da noi, come la virtù e la saggezza; quelli che non sempre sono in nostro potere, come gli onori, le ricchezze e la salute. Il caso di Elisabetta, giovane, virtuosa e nobile, ma in precarie condizioni di salute ne era una conferma. Elisabetta, infatti, era vittima della sfortuna toccata alla sua famiglia: il padre, l’Elettore del Palatinato Federico V, era stato costretto all’esilio dopo la sconfitta subita nella battaglia della Montagna Bianca del 1620, e lei, ancora in giovanissima età, aveva conosciuto tutte le sofferenze e i disagi di una vita precaria e lontana dai genitori.
Che fare, quando s’incorre in situazioni analoghe? Non farsi distrarre da obiettivi sbagliati, come quelli che non sono alla nostra portata, ma contare su ciò che dipende da noi e dalla nostra virtù. È certo infatti – concludeva il filosofo francese – che un uomo ricco e forte, che sia in buona salute e non manchi di nulla, se è saggio e virtuoso, potrà avere una vita più perfettamente piena e contenta rispetto a colui che sia nato storpio e povero. Tuttavia, anche quest’ultimo, se riuscirà a nutrire sentimenti e desideri commisurati al proprio stato, potrà ugualmente vivere una vita soddisfacente.
(tratto da Treccani.it)

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Archiviato in eBook di Filosofia, Filosofia moderna

eBook di filosofia: Platone, Repubblica

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Platone, Repubblica:

“Vi si teorizza lo Stato ottimo, inteso come realizzazione dell’armonica convivenza basata sulla giustizia, la quale è a sua volta analizzata, in relazione sia all’individuo sia allo Stato, in vista dell’assorbimento del singolo nell’organismo statale cui concorre.” (tratto da Treccani.it)

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Archiviato in eBook di Filosofia, Filosofia antica

Bibliografie di edizioni e traduzioni della Repubblica di Platone

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Se siete interessati alla Repubblica di Platone vi segnaliamo due interessanti bibliografie di edizioni e traduzioni dell’opera platonica:

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Archiviato in Bibliografie, Filosofia antica

eBook di filosofia: Hegel, Filosofia della storia

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Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Filosofia della storia

Hegel’s philosophy of history is perhaps the most fully developed philosophical theory of history that attempts to discover meaning or direction in history (1824a, 1824b, 1857). Hegel regards history as an intelligible process moving towards a specific condition—the realization of human freedom. “The question at issue is therefore the ultimate end of mankind, the end which the spirit sets itself in the world” (1857: 63). Hegel incorporates a deeper historicism into his philosophical theories than his predecessors or successors. He regards the relationship between “objective” history and the subjective development of the individual consciousness (“spirit”) as an intimate one; this is a central thesis in his Phenomenology of Spirit (1807). And he views it to be a central task for philosophy to comprehend its place in the unfolding of history. “History is the process whereby the spirit discovers itself and its own concept” (1857: 62). Hegel constructs world history into a narrative of stages of human freedom, from the public freedom of the polis and the citizenship of the Roman Republic, to the individual freedom of the Protestant Reformation, to the civic freedom of the modern state. He attempts to incorporate the civilizations of India and China into his understanding of world history, though he regards those civilizations as static and therefore pre-historical (O’Brien 1975). He constructs specific moments as “world-historical” events that were in the process of bringing about the final, full stage of history and human freedom. For example, Napoleon’s conquest of much of Europe is portrayed as a world-historical event doing history’s work by establishing the terms of the rational bureaucratic state. Hegel finds reason in history; but it is a latent reason, and one that can only be comprehended when the fullness of history’s work is finished: “When philosophy paints its grey on grey, then has a shape of life grown old. … The owl of Minerva spreads its wings only with the falling of the dusk” ((Hegel 1821: 13). (See O’Brien (1975), Taylor (1975), and Kojève (1969) for treatments of Hegel’s philosophy of history.)

It is worth observing that Hegel’s philosophy of history is not the indefensible exercise of speculative philosophical reasoning that analytic philosophers sometimes paint it. His philosophical approach is not based solely on foundational apriori reasoning, and many of his interpretations of concrete historical developments are quite insightful. Instead he proposes an “immanent” encounter between philosophical reason and the historical given. His prescription is that the philosopher should seek to discover the rational within the real—not to impose the rational upon the real. “To comprehend what is, this is the task of philosophy, because what is, is reason” (1821: 11). His approach is neither purely philosophical nor purely empirical; instead, he undertakes to discover within the best historical knowledge of his time, an underlying rational principle that can be philosophically articulated (Avineri 1972).” (tratto da Philosophy of History, SEP)

 

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Archiviato in eBook di Filosofia, Filosofia contemporanea, Filosofia della storia

Student Pulse. The International Student Journal: la rivista open-access degli studenti universitari

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Student Pulse. The International Student Journal  è il periodico open-access accademico che pubblica articoli e saggi di studenti universitari (laureati e non) di ogni parte del mondo. Gli articoli saranno sottoposti a revisione. La filosofia è compresa tra gli ambiti disciplinari della rivista.

Questi sono i requisiti per pubblicare:

  •   Expression of new, provocative, or intellectually intriguing ideas;
  • Meticulous referencing of other high-quality sources;
  • Consistent use of proper grammatical and stylistic conventions;
  • Writing and research that is polished and ready for consumption by a large audience.

 

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Archiviato in Periodici

EPEKEINA. International Journal of Ontology: il periodico online dedicato all’ontologia

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EPEKEINA. International Journal of Ontology.History and Critics è il periodico semestrale open-access edito dal CRF-Centro Internazionale per la Ricerca Filosofica dedicato all’ontologia.

 It covers a wide range of research on Ontology including Metaphysics, Epistemology, Ethics, History of Philosophy, Philosophy of Science, Philosophy of Language, Philosophy of Religion, Philosophy of Mind, Political Philosophy, and other relevant areas of philosophical research. It seeks to provide an international platform for scholars worldwide to exchange their most recent philosophical research latest findings.

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Archiviato in Ontologia, Periodici

eBook di filosofia: J.-F. Lyotard, Libidinal Economy

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Jean-Francois Lyotard, Libidinal Economy

“In the early 1970s Lyotard developed a philosophy based around Sigmund Freud’s theory of the libido. For Lyotard, libidinal energy can be used as a “theoretical fiction” to describe the transformations that take place in society. After his break with Marxism and rejection of totalising theory, he sought to develop a theory that will take account of multiple and different forces and desires at work in any political or social situation, from the writing of theory to revolutionary politics to global economics. Lyotard’s libidinal philosophy is developed in the major work Libidinal Economy and in two sets of essays, Dérive à partir de Marx et Freud [some of which is translated in Driftworks] and Des Dispositifs Pulsionnels. Libidinal Economy is an unusual and difficult work, and encompasses a complex set of theories concerning politics, economics, theory, academic style, and readings of Marx and Freud. It is written in a bewildering combination of styles (at times reading more like an avant-garde novel than a philosophical text), a method Lyotard uses in an attempt to overcome the limitations he sees in traditional academic theory.

The libidinal philosophy begins Lyotard’s general commitment to an ontology of events, which also underlies his later postmodern philosophy. Lyotard sees reality in terms of unpredictable happenings (events), rather than structured regularities. These events can be interpreted in different ways, and no single interpretation will capture events accurately. Events always exceed interpretation; there is always something “left over” that an interpretation does not account for. In the libidinal philosophy Lyotard uses the idea of libidinal energy to describe events and the way they are interpreted or exploited, and he develops a philosophy of society and theory in terms of the economy of libidinal energies. Lyotard uses the terms “libidinal intensities,” and “affects” to refer to events. These intensities and affects are, in more common terminology, feelings and desires. In the terms of Freudian psychoanalysis, they are the “primary processes” of the libido, the forces that exist in the body on a more basic level than the “secondary processes” of the conscious mind. In particular, Lyotard focuses on sexual desire. He uses these terms metaphorically, however, to describe the workings of reality and society as a whole, divorcing them from their usual attachments to human beings. Lyotard describes the wholly impersonal as well as the personal in terms of feelings and desires, and paints a picture of the world that moves and is moved in the ways that feelings move people. Lyotard admits that this description of everything in libidinal terms is a “theoretical fiction,” merely a way of speaking which gives us useful terms for theorizing about what happens in the world. Metaphysically, Lyotard is a materialist, and for him affects must be understood as concrete material entities. An affect might be a sound, a color, a smile or a caress: anything which has an ability to “move,” to produce feelings and desires. Affects are structured and interpreted in systems made up of dispositifs, libidinal dispositions or set-ups, and society is composed of multitudes of different dispositions that compete to exploit the energies of libidinal events. Lyotard develops a complex set of figures to describe how this process takes place.

Libidinal Economy begins with the figure of a body (ambivalently sexed), being cut open and spread out to form a flat, band-like surface. Lyotard is here beginning to describe a region on which libidinal intensities take place and on which they meet with the dispositifs that channel libidinal energy. This region is material like the body, but it is not yet organized, thus the figure of dismemberment. The flat band that the body has become is then given a twist and joined end to end, forming a moebius strip (a circular figure which has only one surface due to the twist it contains; a line traced along one side of the strip will end up on the other side without breaking contact with the surface). This strip is then set in motion, circulating so fast it glows red with heat. This is the libidinal band (sometimes called the libidinal skin). It represents the “primary processes” of desire and libidinal intensity in which libidinal energy circulates in an aleatory fashion, not yet investing anything. Because the libidinal band is a moebius strip, desire circulates on only one surface; there is no inside or outside. In time the band begins to slow and cool, and forms what Lyotard calls “the (disjunctive) bar.”

As the bar slows, sometimes it invests this region, sometimes that. It becomes disjunctive, distinguishing this from not-this. This stage in the transformation of the libidinal band represents the formation of rational thought, dominated by binary logic and the law of noncontradiction. Finally the bar stops and forms a stable disjunction. Lyotard describes the bar as then turning around on itself and creating an enclosed space, a theatrical volume. This is the particular transformation of the libidinal band – or the particular dispositif on the libidinal band – that gives rise to representation and theory. The theatrical space has an inside and an outside, a clear disjunction between this and not-this. Lyotard’s image of theory as theatre is based on the etymological relationship between the two terms; they are both derived from the Greek theasthai, meaning to look at, contemplate, or behold. The theorist is like a spectator who views the representation of the world (outside the theatre) on the stage (inside the theatre).

Lyotard’s description of the transformations of the libidinal band is a theoretical fiction which provides an account of how the world works through the interplay of intense, excited libidinal energies and the stable structures which exploit them and dampen their intensity. The band is the space on which libidinal intensities meet dispositifs, or libidinal set-ups. These set-ups channel energy into more or less stable systems and structures, and therefore all dispositifs, all systems and structures, can be described in terms of the slowing and cooling of the band. An example would be the way political institutions channel desires to change society away from violent, disruptive eruptions towards more moderate, less disruptive modes of action. Systems exploit libidinal intensities by channeling them into stable structures. And yet, these systems deny their own origins in intense and aleatory libidinal energy, taking themselves to be permanent and stable. Systems hide, or dissimulate, affects (libidinal intensities). Conversely, however, affects dissimulate systems. Systems and affects dissimulate each other. This means that systems contain and hide affects, and that affects contain and hide the possibility for forming systems. Dissimulation is a concept that allows us to see the elements of the libidinal economy as duplicitous. That is, they have more than one possibility. It is always possible for intensities to channel into a stable system, or to disrupt a system by destabilising it through intense investment.

Lyotard develops a critical but nuanced approach towards theory, politics and economics within the terms of the libidinal philosophy. His prime concern is that the structures that exploit libidinal intensities tend to become hegemonic. That is, they tend to claim sole right to the exploitation or interpretation of intensities. At the same time, they often deny libidinal intensities themselves, taking themselves to be primary and stable structures. Lyotard sees these tendencies as limiting and nihilistic, in the sense that they deny the full possibilities of the expression of intensities. In theory, politics, and cultural conventions, structured dispositions take themselves to be the actual structures of reality or “correct” interpretations, thus limiting the possibilities of change. For Lyotard change is life affirming, whereas the stable structures that inhibit change are nihilistic and life denying. However, Lyotard does not simply assert libidinal intensity as an affirmative “other” to nihilism. For Lyotard, there is no affirmative region, no pure outside to nihilism. Lyotard does not propose that we champion affects, singularities, intensities and libidinal energy over systems, structures, theory, concepts and representation. This is because the only way libidinal energies can exist is within structures. Lyotard does not advocate a simple liberation of desire and does not attempt to set up a place beyond representation which would be immune to the effects of nihilism. Lyotard presents us, rather, with a metaphysical system in which intensities and structures are both essential elements of the libidinal economy.

Lyotard’s response to the nihilism of structure takes place through the concept of dissimulation, which suggests that libidinal energy must work within structures. All structures contain libidinal energy as an under-exploited potentiality, waiting to be released and to flow into new structures. This libidinal energy is the event, which always contains more possibilities for interpretation and exploitation than any single structure can give it. Lyotard’s libidinal philosophy prescribes a “freeing up” of structures, so that events may be allowed their maximum potentiality of expression in competing interpretations and dispositions. Releasing the energy in structures in turn creates new events, with their own energetic potentialities. Because the event is unpredictable, we cannot actively control the way it will be released and form new structures. However, we can “act passively” so as to encourage the maximum release of intensity within structures. Lyotard’s own style of writing in Libidinal Economy is one attempt to do this: by multiplying genres of discourse, there is no overall dominant structure in the text and it is open to several competing modes of reading, interpretation and application. Ultimately, libidinal philosophy suggests a method of subversion from within existing structures through experimentation with the forms of those structures.” (tratto da Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

*Il copyright delle opere linkate appartiene ai rispettivi autori. Citandola in questa pagina ci si avvale del principio del fair dealing in quanto la diffusione che ne viene fatta è a fini di critica, recensione, informazione e insegnamento e non ha scopi economici. Gli autori possono comunque e in qualunque momento richiederne la rimozione.

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Archiviato in eBook di Filosofia, Filosofia contemporanea

eBook di filosofia: B. Russell, The Problems of Philosophy

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Bernard Russell, The Problems of Philosophy

Nel periodo tra il 1918 e il 1925 Russell svolse una serie di ricerche sul problema della conoscenza e sulla filosofia del linguaggio, delineando le tesi principali dell’atomismo logico (Philosophical essays, 1910, trad. it. Filosofia e scienza; The problems of philosophy, 1912, trad. it. I problemi della filosofia; Our knowledge of external world, 1914, trad. it. La conoscenza del mondo esterno; The analysis of mind, 1921, trad. it. Analisi della mente; The analysis of matter, 1927, trad. it. L’analisi della materia; Logic and knowledge: essays 1901-1950, 1956, trad. it. Logica e conoscenza). Russell elaborò ‒ risentendo in parte dell’influssso di Wittgenstein ‒ una concezione di un linguaggio ideale concepito come raffigurazione della realtà e costituito di proposizioni molecolari o complesse riducibili a proposizioni semplici o atomiche a loro volta formate esclusivamente di nomi che, a livello linguistico, corrispondono a dati sensoriali non ulteriormente analizzabili. La filosofia di Russell più che a elaborare precise teorie fu dedicata alla presentazione di un temperato scetticismo, che, da una parte, sottolineava l’importanza delle verità scientifiche, e, dall’altra, invitava a evitare qualsiasi sistema speculativo, cioè la metafisica (An outline of philosophy, 1928, trad. it. Sintesi filosofica; An inquiry into meaning and truth, 1940, trad. it. Significato e verità; Human knowledge: its scope and limits, 1948, trad. it. La conoscenza umana: le sue possibilità e i suoi limiti; Unpopular essays, 1951, trad. it. Saggi impopolari; My philosophical development, 1959, trad. it. La mia vita in filosofia; Essays in skepticism, 1963, trad. it. Saggi scettici). ” (tratto da Treccani.it)

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Archiviato in eBook di Filosofia, Filosofia contemporanea, Filosofia del linguaggio

Sul Canale Youtube del MAC di Teolo video del Prof. Dino Formaggio

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[D. Formaggio, Il carro del sole, 1983. Lamine e bacchette in ottone, ruote e ingranaggi per pompe idrauliche]

Sul Canale Youtube del Museo di Arte contemporanea del Comune di Teolo trovate alcuni video di interventi a trasmissioni televisive del Prof. Dino Formaggio.

Il Museo è stato inaugurato e aperto al pubblico nell’ottobre del 1993. É stato intitolato a Dino Formaggio – oltre che per i meriti e la notorietà acquisita come filosofo e critico d’arte – per il fatto che si devono a lui tutte le generose donazioni di opere di pittura e scultura che costituiscono il patrimonio del Museo.
In linea con una filosofia dell’arte di ispirazione fenomenologica di cui Formaggio fu promotore in Italia, l’originalità della raccolta museale, che conta ormai duecento opere di ottantasette artisti, non consiste nel documentare tendenze o scuole dell’arte di questo secolo o nel riunire artisti che si richiamano a un manifesto (pur raccogliendo alcuni autori, come Renato Birolli, Fiorenzo Tomea, Aligi Sassu, Alberto Casarotti, Dino Lanaro, che maturarono nell’ambiente del movimento milanese di ‘Corrente”, animato da Ernesto Treccani e che divenne, sul finire degli anni Trenta, un riferimento per i dissidenti dall’imperante novecentismo), ma nel presentare un campione, certamente limitato ma sufficientemente vario, dei notevoli rivolgimenti tecnici e culturali che l’arte ha conosciuto in questo secolo.

Vi segnaliamo inoltre che il 20 settembre presso il Museo è stata inaugurata la mostra per celebrare il centenario della nascita del filosofo Dino Formaggio: L’arte, il senso di una vita. Disegni, acquarelli, oli e sculture di Dino Formaggio artista. La rassegna propone una serie di disegni, acquarelli, oli e sculture del Filosofo, fino ad oggi conservati presso la sua dimora di Illasi (VR). 

Le opere d’arte esposte rappresentano un unicum nella storia della cultura nel senso che offrono le immagini che un filosofo, tra i più importanti della filosofia italiana del secondo Novecento, ha elaborato per rappresentare  nella concretezza del fare artistico alcuni dei vertici più significativi del suo pensiero.  Le immagini esposte, infatti, partono raccontando la sua vicenda personale ed umana, i suoi ricordi dell’infanzia – nei paesaggi di Marzio o Borgio Verezzi, nei ritratti dei genitori o dei piccoli alunni della povera scuola elementare di Motta Visconti (la sua prima esperienza in cattedra) – per arrivare alle figure simboliche del suo discorso filosofico, come il “Prometeo” che sottrae il fuoco agli dei per donarlo agli uomini, o il “Don Chisciotte” che, lancia in resta, combatte contro ogni ingiustizia. Queste figure, dunque oltre e al di là del valore artistico, rappresentano anche la traduzione visiva dei temi più profondi del suo impegno morale e filosofico.

Sono opere assolutamente originali, che consentono di “vedere” la filosofia, che traducono nella materia formata dalla intelligenza delle mani la speculazione filosofica. Ora questa mostra propone un “caso culturale”, quello di un filosofo che non solo esprime ma realizza immagini che “sono” il suo pensiero.”

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Archiviato in Filosofia contemporanea, Video